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ABSTRACT
Every airline union claims to work for safety and presents anecdotes where
greater airline safety has been achieved through union efforts. The effect unionization has
on safety outcomes in U.S. commercial airlines, however, wasn’t found to be previously
tested. Studies have shown that in industries such as coal mining, retail, and construction,
unionization does lead to an increase in safety. This study evaluated the safety rates of 15
major US commercial airlines to compare the difference between unionized and nonunionized airlines. These safety rates were compared based on if and how long each
airline’s pilots and flight attendants have been unionized, to determine if unionization had
an effect on safety outcomes. The 15 airlines included in the study identified as operating
most of the years between 1990 and 2013, with annual departures averaging over
130,000, available through the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Accident and Incident
information was acquired through the National Transportation Safety Board database.
The number of accident and incidents divided by the total departures at each airline was
used as the safety rate. Union websites provided information on unionization at the
airlines. Due to the complex nature of the aviation industry, a number of confounding
factors could have affected the tests, including mergers, route structures, and legislation.
To help control for these confounding factors, this study was limited to airlines with a
stable presence in the industry over time, which limited the number of airlines included.
No significant difference was found between unionized and non-unionized airlines in this
study, though the mean safety rate of unionized airlines was found be better than nonviii

unionized airlines. This study did not take into account safety improvements that were
union-backed and eventually required at all airlines, regardless of unionization. Due to
the large sample size of the small population the difference in safety rate means could be
indicative of greater safety in unionized airlines.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Aviation is a high-risk industry, with potentially disastrous safety consequences
for employees, companies, and the public. As representatives of the front line employees
of an airline, pilot and flight attendant labor unions are heavily invested in creating the
safest airlines possible. While every airline labor union claims to work towards safety,
the actual effect of a union on airline operations is unproven. Safety in airlines is
achieved through several different methods, each of which work together to foster safety
in the industry. The most common methods to increase safety include regulation, the
efforts of individual airlines, and the efforts of labor unions. The purpose of this thesis is
to determine the relationship between safety and unionization in US airlines, and to
quantify the effect, if any, that labor unions have on safety.
The 2009 Colgan Air crash in New York prompted nationwide outrage over the
conduct of smaller regional airlines (Wald, 2009), and resulted in regulation reforms for
Part 121 commercial air carriers. (Dorr & Duquette, 2013). The effects of these changes
are yet to be fully realized; there is concern that they may be too restrictive and harm the
industry's ability to recruit the new pilots desperately needed for the increase in air travel
(Thurber, 2013), though the regulation may result in fewer safety errors.
Regulation is, of course, not the only way to increase safety in the airlines.
Particularly in industries with large barriers to entry (such as aviation), management is
1

concerned with keeping expensive equipment in good working condition. Alaska Airlines
recently debuted a “Ready, Safe, Go!” campaign, focusing on a company-wide dedication
to safety (Prnewswire.com, 2014). But airlines controlled by boards and other stake
holders may focus on short term financial savings, and not adequately take the rare but
extreme costs of a safety error into consideration. Indeed, several studies have shown that
the myopic views of financially insecure airlines lead to an underinvestment in safety
(Noronha & Singal, 2004, and Deppe, Hansen & Swearingen, 2012). This shortcoming
leaves the public and airline employees open to long term safety vulnerabilities. Known
as a “tombstone technology” (Schiavo, 1997), changes in the aviation industry,
particularly expensive changes, often require a large number of deaths before safety
innovations become industry standards.
As representatives of front line workers, airline labor unions have long held that
safety is one of their biggest priorities; for example, the largest pilots’ union, the Air Line
Pilots Association (ALPA), has the motto “Schedule with Safety” (n.d). The American
Airlines pilots union, Allied Pilots Association (APA), has a promise that 20% of its
members' dues go to “support aviation safety” (n.d.). And the Association of Flight
Attendants (AFA) call themselves “Aviation's First Responders” (n.d.), an
acknowledgment of the front line work that flight attendants do for aviation safety.
Since the late 1960s, however, the American workforce has seen a decline of
unionization. In 1967, overall American worker participation in unions was
approximately 28%; in 2011, it was only 12% and falling (Madland, Walter, & Bunker,
2011). If the unions are as good for safety as they claim to be, safety in the airlines could
be compromised by decreasing unionization. If, however, the actual effect of unions on
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safety is negligible, or even negative, then at least from a safety viewpoint the decrease
may be nothing for which to be concerned. Therefore, determining the relationship
between unions and airline safety could have a dramatic impact upon how the aviation
industry and the public as a whole view labor unions in commercial airlines.
No studies were found that attempted to determine the direct impact that labor
unions have on safety in the aviation industry. In other industries, such as retail, coal
mining, and construction, studies (Sinclair, Martin, & Sears, 2010, Gillin, Baltz, Gassel,
Kirsch, Vaccaro, 2002, and Morantz, 2012) have confirmed that safety culture and safety
outcomes are both improved in unionized workplaces. Noronha & Singal, (2004)
concluded that companies in poor financial health, possibly as an unintended
consequence of union-affected reasons such as high wages or strict working rules, may
have an increase in safety error instances as a result of less investment in safety programs
or maintenance. Rose (1989) determined that a 9.92% decrease in operating margin
results in a 5% increase in total accident rate. But a later study by Raghavan (2012)
showed that even poor financial health may not be an indication of safety investment by
an airline.
This study proposes to determine if there is a labor union effect on safety in the
commercial airline industry by comparing accident and incident rates to the extent of
unionization in a company. This difference in mean safety rate between unionized and
non-unionized airlines is the “Union Effect,” that is, the measurable effect that a union
has on the safety accident and incident rate of individual airlines.

2

Literature Review
Support for the positive, neutral, or negative link between safety and commercial
airline unionization has not been well researched. However, in other industries, such as
retail, coal mining, and construction, research has been done in an attempt to understand
the connections between unionization and safety outcomes. A study by Sinclair, Martin,
and Sears (2010) determined that union status had a significant positive correlation with
the perception of job safety and a good safety culture in the retail industry. The authors
indicated an implication of the study is that it is important for managers to alert workers
to dangerous situations more effectively, and to practice better safety habits. An
alternative implication, however, could be that unions are currently more effective than
traditional manager-employee relations at disseminating safety information and nurturing
a positive safety culture. A study by Morantz (2012) showed a positive relationship
between unionization and safety in coal mines. Although unionization predicts higher
total and non-traumatic injuries, it is also true that unionization predicts a substantial and
significant decline in traumatic injuries and fatalities. Morantz hypothesizes that these
seemingly contradictory findings indicate not only an increase in safety for unionized
coal miners, but that reporting of non-traumatic injuries increases in unionized
workplaces. These findings concur with the other studies in this research indicating
higher incident reporting and a greater awareness of safety culture in unionized
workplaces.
Gillin, Baltz, Gassel, Kirsch, and Vaccaro (2002) found there was a positive
correlation between unionization and safety in the construction industry. Unionized
employees were significantly more likely to feel supported by their peers and superiors,
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to be made aware of dangerous situations, to have more safety meetings, and to perceive
that risk taking was not a part of their job. This last point has particularly important
implications for aviation, as a risk-taker in an aircraft could easily kill hundreds of
passengers and innocents on the ground. Risk-taking is not encouraged in the
standardized commercial aviation industry, and a risky pilot is a liability in the strictly
controlled cockpit.
One problem identified by Morantz in the 2009 meta-analysis is that few, if any,
studies attempted to determine which union activities were the ones that had an effect on
safety. Beneficial activities may be supported by management or unions in some
companies but not in others, which presents confounding variable. It is possible that a
program supported by unions in one company or industry would have a similar program
supported by management in another company or industry. This possible confounding
variable is of some concern to a search for the “union effect” specifically in airlines.

Financial Resources and Safety Spending
Finite resources are available to an airline. Revenue varies greatly in the aviation
industry, due to fluctuating fuel prices and unstable (if not entirely unpredictable) trends
in consumer purchases. In recent years, fuel has accounted for an average of 23% of the
cost of operating a US commercial airline, and labor costs another 28%, representing the
two largest expenditures of an airline (Airlines.org, n.d.). Some of the variation is passed
directly to the customer in increasingly common fuel surcharges (Martin, 2012), helping
airlines to offset unplanned cost increases. Labor costs, on the other hand, are
infrequently negotiated and do not directly rely on the airline's short term ability to pay.
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Therefore, maintenance programs and safety investments are areas in which the higher
wages negotiated by the labor unions, and their net effect on airlines, may hurt airline
safety.
A study by Deppe, Hansen, and Swearingen (2012) found a positive relationship
between the level of maintenance expenditures and financial distress for financially weak
companies. However, “an inverse relationship between maintenance expenditures and
financial distress was found to exist for financially strong companies....given that
maintenance cost is a measure of safety, the results provide evidence of myopic behavior
in the deregulated period and an erosion of safety between the regulated and deregulated
periods (pg. 17)” Overall, this study finds that airlines have become less safe as a result
of deregulation, effects of which include lower salaries for workers and lower ticket
prices for travelers. But a 1989 study by Morrison and Winston found that as a result of
deregulation, and thus the increased cost cutting competition between airlines, airline
safety has not been significantly compromised. Deregulation occurred in 1978, around
the same time as the decline in unionization (Moore, 1986), and was possibly a factor in
the decrease of safety found in the Deppe, Hansen, and Swearingen study.
In 2004, Noronha and Singal found that a whole letter difference in bond rating of
an air carrier affected the likelihood of that carrier having a safety error by 10%.
Companies with higher bond ratings, a measure of financial health and security, were
significantly less likely to have a “safety mishap.” A study conducted by Raghavan in
2012, however, found that there is little relation between the financial health of a
company and its spending on maintenance. One of the criticisms of the Noronha and
Singal study, which was mentioned in the study itself, is that operating margin and
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profitability, the two measures used by the study, are historical trends. The investment in
safety, however, is a forward-looking prediction of future payoffs and requirements that
are affected by, but also largely independent from historical trends. By looking at the
Altman-Z score of a company, the measure of the likelihood of bankruptcy in the next
two years, Raghavan’s study determined how financially healthy airline companies were.
Raghavan then used spending on maintenance as a useful metric for determining safety,
much as the Deppe, Hansen, and Swearingen study. Raghavan’s study found that, despite
there being a non-significant negative relationship between financial health and spending
on safety, “airlines in poor financial health do not compromise on safety.” (pg. 256)
Therefore, although airlines may have limited resources to spread between safety
spending and potentially higher union-negotiated labor wages, safety may not
significantly affected by such labor contracts.
Gittell, Von Nordenflycht, and Kochan (2004) conducted a study that brings the
financial costs of the union-airline relationship on safety one step further. Their mixed
methods study showed that the nature of the relationship between employees and
management was more important to the financial health of an airline than the structure of
the relationship. The structure may or may not include union presence. Unions that assist
in a positive relationship between the company and the employees also help create
financially sound airlines. On the other end of the spectrum, airlines with poor employee
relations, with or without unions, are going to have a lower likelihood of long-term
financial health, resulting in a decreased investment in safety.
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Union Activities to Increase Safety
One of the key ways in which unions attempt to increase safety in airlines is
through regulation. For example, ALPA, the largest airline pilot union in the U.S.,
supported H.R. 182, a bill designed to limit the duty time for pilots regardless of the type
of operations they fly (Air Line Pilots Associations, n.d.).. Fatigue is a very dangerous
condition to fly under (Reason, 1997) as human factors, the interaction between people
and machine, have contributed to nearly 80% of all aviation safety errors. Therefore any
successful attempt at limiting fatigue would help to increase safety, which airline unions
recognize and work for. Other regulation changes ALPA and other unions included
having seatbelt signs in commercial cabins, and installing TCAS (Traffic Collision
Avoidance System) in every cockpit. These and other union lobbying efforts at regulation
of the aviation industry have helped to increase safety through the entire industry.
Other union attempts at improving safety are through litigation rather than
regulation. The Teamsters Local 1224 (Airline Professionals Association, n.d.) is a union
representing pilots from eleven regional airlines from around the country. It recently filed
a lawsuit against ABX Air on behalf of a represented captain, who had been terminated
for “exercising his FAA-mandated authority to ensure safe flight operations and his
refusal to operate the aircraft in a manner that was prohibited by FAA-approved aircraft
procedures (Airline Professionals Association, n.d.).” The captain had “identified safety
concerns” while operating in Japan, and requested changes to the flight plan. He was
fired, allegedly for the economic inconvenience, and his dismissal was announced to all
the crew members at ABX Air. The union determined that the announcement created fear
of reprisal for other captains who might attempt to operate their aircraft in a safer but less
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economic way. The Teamsters filed suit not only to protect the individual captain, but to
secure every captain’s right to operate their aircraft in a manner they deem fit for every
pilot at ABX Air. While the effect of an accident that does not occur is extremely
difficult to determine, ensuring that pilots are able to amend or cancel a flight plan for
safety reasons is paramount to good airline safety.
Educating members is another way that unions seek to increase safety for their
members, which consequently increases safety for the entire airline and air travel
industry. Information campaigns are popular methods for unions to improve workplace
conditions at airlines. ALPA produced an informative and easy-to-read brochure titled
“The Airline Pilots Guide to Fighting Fatigue” that was inserted into the Air Line Pilot
magazine mailed to union members (Wykoff, Kay, Kilmer, Nordengen & Gauthier,
2008). This brochure, which is also available online in PDF format, contains the
definition and causes of fatigue, how to spot fatigue in oneself and others, and strategies
to try to mitigate the effects of fatigue. While pilots are exposed to this information from
many sources throughout their careers, reminders and reinforcement increase the
effectiveness of their knowledge. The Association of Flight Attendants has a “Latest
News” segment on their website that includes videos and articles to remind flight
attendants of the safest procedures and other safety upgrades the AFA has secured
(AFA.org, n.d.).
There is, of course, plenty of incentive and opportunity for organizations to
provide information of all sorts to their employees. Unions, however, may be able to
reach members of organizations that are too small to devote many resources to informing
employees of best practices or potential workplace hazards. And they may be more
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effective at promoting safety practices that are labor or resource intensive and therefore
may not be promoted by the airline.

Purpose of the Study
As previously discussed, this study found limited research done to determine if
there is a difference between airlines with or without a labor union and that airline’s
safety record. The meta-analysis by Morantz published in 2009 indicated a need to
identify the empirical relationship between safety and unions. Morantz identified that
many unions use a safety emphasis to create the impression that they are beneficial not
just to their individual members, but to the group and industry as a whole. Research
supporting this, however, appears to be absent. In the face of declining union
membership, determining the truth of the union impact on safety could have enormous
implications for the safety and public confidence in air travel. Therefore, the purpose of
this study is to test the effect of labor unions on safety as it relates to the commercial
airline industry. The independent variable is defined as the safety rate (the total number
of accidents and incidents divided by the total number of departures) between 1990 and
2013, including accidents that result in deaths or major aircraft losses, and incidences that
result in injuries or minor aircraft damage. The dependent variable is the extent of
unionization, if any, at the airline. Unionization includes both pilot and flight attendant
workgroups, who have been unionized for all or part of the time between 1990 and 2013,
or not unionized at all.

9

Research Questions
To guide the tests, the research question is:
Is there a difference in safety rates of unionized and non unionized U.S. commercial
airlines?
To further clarify the relationship, a sub-question was also asked:
Is the safety rate difference affected by the severity of loss of safety (accidents versus
incidents)?
By answering these questions, this study determined if labor unions affect the
safety rate of an airline as compared to non-unionized airlines. If a positive union effect
can be found, the decrease in unionization should be considered a problem for future
safety in the airlines. If a negative correlation is found, the usefulness of unions may still
be considered based on other merits, but not necessarily on the grounds of safety.

10

CHAPTER II
METHODS AND PROCEDURES

Introduction
In order to determine the relationship between labor unions and safety in the US
airlines, a quantitative study was conducted. This study used public data available online
on airline safety errors and the extent of unionization. The data collected was used for a
statistical test to determine the “union effect” on safety.

Participants
The participants in this study were commercial airlines that operate mostly or
wholly within the United States of America. These airlines were identified through the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) website as being US-based and certified for
operations in the United States National Airspace. The constantly merging and changing
nature of the airline industry creates a possible confounding variable for finding the
“union effect,” and complicated this study. While major airlines maintain a stable
presence in the industry throughout years and decades, regional airlines create a shifting
landscape of unionization and cultures, through creation, mergers, and bankruptcies.
Other times, the regional airline flies on behalf of multiple major carriers, such as
SkyWest's operations for United, Delta, Alaska, American Eagle, and US Airways
(Customer service plan, n.d.). Because of the difficulty of determining the impact of these
11

mergers on the employees and their unionization, each airline was considered on its own
when it exists as an individual company, regardless of past or future unionization and
mergers. In the case of regional airlines with strong ties or outright ownership by a major
airline, any incidences or accidents were considered for the record of the regional airline
alone, and did not reflect on the incident/accident rate of the major airline. This ensured
that the unionization of each airline was considered for its own incident/accident rate, and
gave a more accurate “union effect.” For example, non-unionized SkyWest's
incident/accident rate did not affect the unionized Alaska Airline's incident/accident rate,
even though many Alaska Airlines flights are operated by SkyWest (Customer Service
Plan, n.d.). Airlines that operated for at least 15 years since 1990, had an average of at
least 130,000 departures per year, and had data available through the National
Transportation Safety Board and the Bureau of Transportation Statistics were considered
for this study.
Due to the nature of this study, approval from the Institutional Review Board at
the University of North Dakota was not required as there was no data collection
pertaining to individuals.

Data Collection
The methods design for this project consisted of a collection of existing data. All
the required information was a matter of public record. Accidents and incidents are
required by federal law to be reported to the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB). Airlines were identified through the FAA website. Unionization statistics were
available through individual union websites and individual airline websites.
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Incidents and Accidents
Accidents and incidents have specific definitions according to the NTSB and are
laid out in a 1994 document on the Investigation Process Research Resource Site.
Essentially, an accident is a loss of safety where a fatal or major injury happens to a
person or aircraft, including engine damage or hull loss. An incident is defined as “an
occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft which
affects or could affect the safety of operation” (Investigation Process Research Resource
Site, 1994).
These levels of safety measurement are set by industry and legal professionals,
who have had years to develop exact criteria for safety errors. This ensures that, while
each accident is unique, similar results are grouped together, making for a more accurate
comparison. Using the same levels as the NTSB and FAA also enables the researcher to
access records and evaluate safety errors for the appropriateness of including them in the
tests.
As with unionization, incidents and accidents were measured in different ways for
different tests. The total number of accidents and incidents between 1990 and 2013 was
determined for each airline. The number of incidents, accidents, and incidents/accidents
combined were then be divided by the total departures between 1990 and 2013 of each
airline, creating an accident, incident, and total safety error rate that could be fairly
compared across different airlines. Though reporting safety rates in terms of hours or
miles flown is common, comparing safety rates by number of departures is a good metric
because the most dangerous and incident/accident prone portions of a flight are take-off
and landing (Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airline Operations, Worldwide
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operations 1959-2014, 2014, pg. 20). Both take-off and landing happen only once per
flight, regardless of the total number of hours flown. In the same eight hours, a major
airline might only fly between a single city pair, while a regional airline could complete
up to six different legs. So while they might be flying for the same amount of time, a
major and a regional airline have a very different number of opportunities for having an
incident or accident for a similar number of hours of operation. At the same time, a major
airline might have thousands of operations a day, to a regional airline's dozens or
hundreds of operations. By creating an accident/incident rate that takes both these
concerns into consideration, very different airlines can be more accurately compared.
Aircraft manufacturer Boeing also measures losses per million departures, recognizing
that not all flight hours carry the same probability for damage (Statistical Summary of
Commercial Jet Airline Operations, Worldwide operations 1959-2014, 2014).
A separate test was run for each rate to determine if there is a difference in safety
rate for unionized and non-unionized airlines for only incidents, only accidents, or on the
total rate of both accidents and incidents.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB.gov, n.d.) is the agency that
investigates and collects records of aviation accidents and incidents. These records are
public information, and were gathered online for this study. The database was filtered for
operations within the United States by US Commercial carriers operating under Part 121
(Air Carrier) certifications. 2032 records met the search criteria, though only the larger
passenger airlines were included in the study. 330 cases, including accidents and
incidents were included.
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Incidents and accidents that occurred outside of the United States were excluded
from this study. There are simply too many confounding factors involved with such
incidents, including language and cultural misunderstandings, varying safety standards
between countries, and possible unfamiliarity with international procedures. The
exclusion of these accidents makes comparing larger, international airlines and smaller,
US-only airlines more equitable.

Airlines
The airlines included in the study were AirTran/ValuJet, Alaska, America West,
American, Continental, Delta, Frontier, Horizon, JetBlue, Mesa, SkyWest, Southwest,
United, and US Airways. Though large enough to be considered for the study, American
Eagle/Envoy/Simmons Air has too convoluted a history to be reliably included in the
study. The large number of mergers, rebranding, unionization and de-unionization create
enough confounding factors to make any difference between safety rates for unionized
and non-unionized unreliable. And though they were both large and consistent enough to
be included in the study, the two airlines by the name ExpressJet were excluded. Since
the accident reports didn’t specify which ExpressJet they accident report was for, there
was too much difficulty of separating each airline's actions for proper analysis.
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Table 1. Preliminary Sample of Annual Departures. Departure information is from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics for example years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2013.
The average of the sample years is included.

Airline Name

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2013

Southwest

338,106

685220

903831

1029284

1114811

1124432

865947

A

Delta

836530

878908

894470

644692

725151

759391

789857

A

American

747040

679216

716528

666371

534179

530412

645624

A

768513

723548

418168

401964

411256

622702

A

509613

589166

616956

571911

A

340184

504231

565226

A

500124

A

402283

B

358980

A

356295

B

320640

B

268351

C

261759

C

US Airways

1012767

SkyWest
United

617658

713031

735075

481182

Northwest

474697

509929

537803

478068

200322

443083

516558

426046

426891

387551

295357

238888

ExpressJet (ev)

207868

220221

303573

314949

ExpressJet (xe)

206430

300130

396013

379988

266977

263155

Envoy Air
Continental

446215

Trans World

274922

Eastern Air

261759
254185

291298

261113

B

312057

171713

142997

233924

A

167759

370699

142587

227015

C

210083

195815

204971

A

180873

C

218002

Comair
America West

222001

Westair

180873

191983

Chautauqua
AirTran
Alaska

102537

167444

137952

178893

B

101638

193628

246588

172934

144265

A

133595

147535

159199

139258

156645

139794

A

10134

110181

197979

240654

139737

A

134339

C

132177

A

131569

C

Independence

Business Exp

231283
6539

JetBlue

Horizon Air

734866

134339
163465

Note

237858

Endeavor Air
Mesa

425408

Average

197743

160363

155462

115922

105

131569

Piedmont

156472

115999

111357

127942

C

Cape Air

115530

125362

117412

119435

C

16

Table 1 cont.
Airline Name

1990

1995

2000

PSA Airlines
Air Wisconsin

87492

34200

113934

Hageland Avit
Trans States

133975

105119

Colgan Air
Valujet

2005

2010

2013

113381

120391

115745

116886

C

162389

156307

145886

116701

D

78689

99616

113634

97313

D

139203

52579

54499

97075

D

86933

99216

93074

C

67617

A/E

64381

D

67617

Aloha Airlines

65449

68285

67739

56051

Hawaiian

71167

59036

64063

48919

Compass
Skyway
Frontier

Average

68523

72686

64065

D

55486

60975

58230

C/D

57646

C/D

56814

D

57646
14502

37361

76252

Note

80465

75490

NotesA- Airline was included in the study.
B- Airline was excluded from the study due to large numbers of confounding factors,
including large numbers of mergers, name changes, divisions, acquisitions, or
name duplications.
C- Airline was excluded from the study due to too short a history.
D- Airline was excluded from the study due to being too small in size.
E- ValueJet was included in the study even though it operated for only a few years
because it was a direct predecessor to AirTran

Departure Records
The number of operations used in the safety rate for each carrier was collected
through the Research and Innovative Technology Administration's Bureau of
Transportation Statistics website. This is public information. Departures Performed totals
were available for most major carriers, by year, beginning in 1990 through 2013. Takeoff and landing are the most dangerous phases of flight (Statistical Summary of
Commercial Jet Airline Operations, 2014) and where an accident or incident is most
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likely to occur. Therefore, departures performed was used in this study, as a measure of
individual flights performed, to determine a carrier's safety rate. Some air carriers did not
have reports for departures performed for years they were in service, and so any accidents
or incident report during those years were removed from the study. Atlantic Southeast, a
relatively large and stable airline operating for most of the years between 1990 and 2013,
was excluded because no departure figures were listed.

Unionization
The largest pilot's union, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA, n.d.) website
supplied the majority of unionization data for pilots. Other pilot unions’ websites,
including the Transportation Worker's Union (TWU.org, n.d.), the Teamsters
(teamsterair.org, n.d.) , Southwest Airline Pilot's Association (TWU.org, n.d.), Frontier
Pilots Association (TWU.org. n.d.), and the Allied Pilot's Association (Alliedpilots.org,
n.d.), supplied information about unionization for non-ALPA pilots.
The Association of Flight Attendants (AFA.org, n.d.) represents the majority of
unionized flight attendants at the airlines included in the study. AFA membership
information was supplied through emails with a representative. Membership information
for non-AFA unionized flight attendant workforces came from websites for the
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM.org, n.d.),
Transport Workers Union (TWU.org, n.d.), and the Association of Professional Flight
Attendants (APFA.org, n.d.).
Airlines were grouped according to how long they have been unionized. Group 1
was airlines that have been continuously unionized during their operations between 1990
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and 2013. These airlines were Air Tran, Alaska, American, Continental, Horizon,
Northwest, Southwest, United, and US Airways. Group 2 was airlines that were not
unionized, or that became unionized partway through their operations between 1990 and
2013. These airlines were America West, Delta, JetBlue, Mesa, SkyWest, and ValuJet.
The same tests were run with each group to determine if a statistically significant
difference could be found between different levels of unionization and safety.

Statistical Tests
The dependent variable in this test was the unionization of airlines, measured as
previously described. The independent variable was the number of safety incidences and
accidents, also measured as previously specified. A t-test was used to determine if there
was a difference between the mean of the safety rate of Group 1 (airlines with long
standing unionization), and the mean of the safety rate of Group 2 (recently or nonunionized airlines). Several tests were run to determine if the difference between safety
rates was affected by the severity of the safety error.
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Table 2. Airlines Included in the Study. With the total number of departures (Deps ’90’13), the total number of incidents (Incdnts), the incident safety rate (Inc Rate), the total
number of accidents (Accdnts), the accident safety rate (Acc Rate), the total accidents
plus incidents (Acc+Inc), and the accident plus incident safety rate (Acc+Inc Rate).
Sorted into airlines with longstanding unionization (Group 1), or the recently or nonunionized airlines (Group 2).
Incdnts

Inc Rate

Accdnts

Acc Rate

2,939,497

2

0.68

10

3.40

12

4.08

15,998,872

44

2.75

79

4.94

123

7.67

Alaska

3,399,254

22

6.47

10

2.94

32

9.41

Continental

7,929,064

37

4.67

34

4.29

71

8.95

Horizon

3,611,726

7

1.94

8

2.22

15

4.15

Northwest

9,522,127

29

3.05

33

3.47

62

6.51

Southwest

20,971,304

33

1.57

39

1.86

72

3.43

United

13,906,968

68

4.89

68

4.89

136

9.78

US Airways

14,320,979

32

2.23

37

2.58

69

4.82

3,525,174

8

2.27

20

5.67

28

7.94

18,189,7222

63

3.46

73

4.01

136

7.48

Jet Blue

1,954,866

7

3.46

2

1.02

9

4.60

Mesa

3.286,607

8

2.43

12

3.65

20

6.69

SkyWest

6,056,247

11

1.82

10

1.65

21

3.47

212,477

3

14.12

5

23.53

8

37.65

Airline Name

Deps '90-'13

Acc+Inc Acc+Inc Rate

Longstanding Unionization
AirTran
American

Non- or Recently Unionized
America West
Delta

ValuJet

All timeframes are 1990-2013
Safety rates are reported in the number of incidents, accidents, or incidents plus accidents
per million departures.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS

Independent t-Test
There was no significant difference between the nine Group 1 airlines with either
longstanding unionization (those unionized before 1990, or airlines formed after 1990 but
unionized the same year), and the six Group 2 airlines recently unionized or not
unionized.
For the accident rate (number of accidents per million departures), there appeared
to be a difference between the airlines with longstanding unionization (M= 3.36, SD=
1.13, N=9) and the recently or non-unionized airlines (M= 6.56, SD= 8.51, N=6,
t(5.117)= -.916, p>.05, two-tailed) with the unionized airlines appearing safer, though the
difference was not significant. For the incident rate (number of incidents per million
departures), there also appeared to be a difference between the airlines with longstanding
unionization (M= 3.14, SD= 1.85, N=9) and airlines that were recently unionized or nonUnionized (M= 4.59, SD= 4.73, N=6, t(13)= -.829, p>.05, two-way). Again the unionized
airlines appeared to have fewer incidences than the recently or non-unionized airlines,
though the difference was still not significant.
The largest difference between safety means was in the total safety rate (accidents
+ incidents per million departures). The difference was still not found to be significant,
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however, between airlines with longstanding unionization (M= 6.54, SD= 2.51, N=9) and
recently or non-unionized airlines (M= 11.31, SD= 13.02, N=6, t(5.248)= -.886, p>.05).

ANOVA
No significance was found with a one-way independent ANOVA between airlines
that were unionized between 1990 and 2013, and airlines that were not unionized.
Accident Rate- F(1, 13)= 2.146, p> .05. Incident Rate-F(1, 13)= 3.066, p>.05. Total
Safety (Accident+Incident) Rate- F(1, 13)= 2.792, p>.05
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION

Discussion of Findings
Previous research in other industries indicates that labor unions have a distinct
positive effect on workplace safety. In some industries such as coal mining, this effect is
significant enough to play a role in outcomes between different workplaces in the same
industry. In other industries such as construction, labor unions played a significant role in
the safety culture at different workplaces, including making workers feel more supported
and less likely to take risky actions. The history of unionization in the airlines indicates
that all unions consider themselves on the forefront of safety promotion, a claim that is
supported by slogans and actions at all of the major airline unions. Airline labor unions
have fought to increase on the job safety for their members through litigation, supporting
regulations, and member education. Labor unions were instrumentals in pushing for the
adoption of safety measures such as TCAS and the anti-fatigue rest rules of FAR117.
Through education labor unions attempted to decrease threats from terrorists and fatigue.
Union sponsored litigation ensured that individual pilots and flight attendants were able
to fulfil their safety-focused job functions without fear of reprisal. Therefore, it was
surprising that labor unions were not found in this study to have a distinct positive effect
on safety rates of unionized or non-unionized airlines. There may be several reasons for
this unexpected finding, including limitations of the t-test in a small population, many
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confounding factors of the industry, and the number of smaller airlines that were
excluded from this study.

Limitations of the t-test
The t-test didn't find any significant differences between the safety rate means of
the unionized and recently or non-unionized airlines. The t-test, though, is designed to
take a small sample of a large population. The airlines included in this study, on the other
hand, were a small population from which this study took a large sample. Of the largest,
most established airlines (those with over 130,000 average departures and operating most
of the years between 1990 and 2013), only three were excluded because of overly
complicated or missing data. Therefore, though the t-test didn't find a significant
difference, it could be surmised from the mean safety rates alone (total safety error rate of
6.54 incidents and accidents per million departures) for longstanding unionized airlines,
versus 11.31 accidents and incidents per million departures for recently or non-unionized
airlines), that unionized airlines do in fact have a better safety rate than non-unionized
airlines.

Confounding Factors
The aviation industry is very complex. Despite the exceptionally high barriers to
entry, such as the highly skilled and regulated workforces, million dollar aircraft, and
gate spaces in airports, or perhaps because of them, airlines are constantly entering and
exiting the industry, or merging and dividing amongst themselves. Since Deregulation in
1978, airlines have been in especially fierce competition, adjusting investments in safety
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and their labor groups as the industry fluctuates (Morrison and Winston, 1989). The
workforce is also constantly changing; at many regional airlines, it is expected that most
pilots will move up to a larger airline as quickly as they can, staying at the regional
airlines perhaps a decade or less of their career (Zillman, 2014). At major airlines, pilots
may only be able to work for a short amount of time due to mandatory retirement at age
65, or other career-limiting factors. The short term nature of the workforce can mean that
a positive safety culture can be harder to build at the regional airlines.
Unionization is a long and difficult process, and requires an engaged workforce
with a long enough memory to be willing to organize (ALPA.org, n.d.). Because of this,
unionization is less likely to find favorable ground in the smaller, regional airlines where
turnover is high. These airlines also have smaller salaries for their workforce (Aviation
Sciences, n.d.), which drastically limits the possible dues amount and curtails any
potential unions' finances. Less well known airlines may also be more willing to risk their
reputations with unethical maneuvers or outright illegal union busting activities than a
large carrier concerned with their public image. These same airlines are more likely to
employ a less experienced workforce (Zillman, 2014), possibly follow less stringent
maintenance schedules, or favor economics over safety. All these issues could lead to a
high level of correlation between high accident/incident rates, regardless of unionization
of the airline. Future studies that include these smaller airlines would be more
comprehensive and might have a different outcome.
Another confounding factor is the extreme range of causes of accidents and
incidents in the airlines. Some accidents are attributed directly to a failure of the airline;
ValuJet's 1996 crash into the Everglades killing everyone on board is attributed partly to
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improper loading procedures of hazardous material, and the lack of recommended fire
detectors in the cargo hold (NTSB, 1998). But other accidents that appear in this study
are less the fault of the airline, such as American and United's involvement in the 9/11
terrorist attacks. In other areas, fault can be much more difficult to assign. Bird strikes
and turbulence are common causes of inflight incidents. These are seemingly random
“acts of God” that happen at any airline, though they may be more or less prevalent
depending on a particular airline's routes. An airline with a good safety culture, however,
may be more proactive in routing to avoid known bird areas, or have better turbulence
procedures in place (Customer Experience Featured Article, 2014). Therefore these
accidents and incidents have been included in the study, as they may be indicative of a
failure of safety culture, and to give a complete range of accidents and incidents.

Labor Unions’ Safety Effect on Non-Unionized Airlines
Despite the fact that some airlines are not unionized, labor unions can have an
effect on the entire airline industry. This is particularly true of safety efforts that may not
be seen as cost effective, and not voluntarily implemented by airlines until they are
required to do so. Safety efforts include the requirement of fire detection and suppression
systems in cargo holds, putting TCAS units in all cockpits, and the creation of antifatigue FAR 117 rest rules. These efforts were strongly backed by airline labor unions
such as ALPA and the AFA, and often fought by airline lobbyists. When adopted, these
safety-positive changes were required at all airlines, not just those that were unionized.
This study, however, only looked at the mean safety rate difference between unionized
and non-unionized airlines. Therefore, any effects that labor unions have on safety that

26

are required for the entire industry did not affect the outcome of this study. It cannot be
concluded that labor unions have no effect on safety. It can only be shown that there was
no significant difference in safety rates between unionized and non-unionized airlines.

Recommendations for Further Study
In order to get a safety rate that encompassed a large timeframe, airlines with a
smaller number of average yearly departures, or with shorter histories were not included
in this study. These airlines may tend to be less unionized, and may have a higher rate of
safety incidents and accidents. In order to get a different understanding of the effect labor
unions have on safety rates, a study that included these smaller airlines might be useful.
Such a study would likely have to encompass a smaller timeframe and may be less likely
to capture a true safety rate due to the infrequent occurrences of airline accidents and
incidents.
Unionization of mechanics, ground crew, and dispatchers was not examined for
this study. This was due to the complicated nature of these labor groups, who may be
contracted workers not under direct airline employment, or the employees may work for
more than one airline depending on the operations any given airport. Each of these front
line worker groups, however, can have a profound impact on safety, from planning to
operations. Labor unionization’s effect on safety could be different if these groups were
included in future studies.

27

REFERENCES
Air Line Pilot Association. (n.d.). About ALPA. Retrieved from
http://www.alpa.org/AboutALPA/WhoWeAre/tabid/2030/Default.aspx
Airline Professionals Association. (n.d.). Welcome to teamsters local 1224. Retrieved
from http://www.ibt1224.org/index.asp
Airlines for America. (n.d.). A4a cost index for U.S. passenger airlines: 2q 2013.
Retrieved from http://www.airlines.org/Pages/A4A-Quarterly-Cost-Index-U.S.Passenger-Airlines.aspx
Association of Flight Attendants (n.d.). Association of flight attendants homepage.
Retrieved from http://www.afacwa.org/
Aviation Sciences, Career Information, Pilot Careers. (n.d.). Retrieved September 14,
2014, from http://www.palomar.edu/aviation/car_info.htm
Customer Service Plan. (n.d.). Retrieved October 30, 2014, from
http://www.skywest.com/fly-skywest-airlines/customerinformation/show/customer-service-plan/#/customer-service-plan/
Deppe, L. A., Hansen, D. R., & Swearingen, J. G. (2012). Airline safety margins
maintenance, expenditures, and myopic behavior: An empirical investigation.
Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, 16(1), 1-24.
Dorr, L., & Duquette, A. (2013, July 10). Press release- FAA boosts aviation safety with
new pilot qualification standards. Retrieved from
http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=14838
28

Esters, M. (2011, July 6). Labor board broadens Delta probe. Retrieved October 31, 2014
from
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023044748045763697626411112
64
Gillin, M., Baltz, D., Gassel, M., Kirsch, L., Vaccaro, D. (2002). Perceived safety
climate, job demands, and coworker support among union and nonunion injured
construction workers. Journal of Safety Research. 22(1), 33-51.
Gittell, J., Von Nordenflycht, A., & Kochan, T. A. (2004). Mututal gains or zero sum?
Labor relations and firm performance in the airline industry. Industrial & Labor
Relations Review, 57(2), 163-180.
International Association of Machinists and Space Workers, (n.d.). Retrieved October 14,
2014, from http://www.iamdl142.org/USA/
Investigation Process Research Resource Site. (1994, October 11). International
investigations standards. Retrieved October 14, 2014, from
http://www.iprr.org/manuals/Annex13.html
Madland, D., Waltner, K., & Bunker, N. (2011, April 4).Unions made the middle class.
Retrieved September 19, 2013, from
http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/labor/report/2011/04/04/9421/unio
ns-make-the-middle-class/
Martin, H. (2012, July 23). Airlines' fuel surcharges far outpacing fuel prices. Los
Angeles Times. Retreieved from
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/23/business/la-fi-travel-briefcase-21013072

29

Mayo, L. (2008, January 1). The representational history of the American Airlines flight
attendants. Retrieved November 14, 2014, from https://www.apfa.org/
Moore, T. G. (1986). US airline deregulation: Its effects on passengers, capital, and
labor. JL & Econ., 29, 1.
Morantz, A. (2009, January). The Elusive Union Safety Effect: Toward a New Empirical
Research Agenda. In 61 st Annual Meeting (p. 130).
Morantz, A. (2012). Coal Mine Safety: Do Unions Make a Difference?. Industrial and
Labor Relations Review, Forthcoming.
Morrison, S. A., & Winston, C. (1989). Airline deregulation and public policy. Science,
245(4919), 707-711.
Noronha, G., & Singal, V. (2004). Financial health and airline safety. Managerial and
Decision Economics, 25(1), 1-16.
National Transportation Safety Board, (1998). Brief of accident (DCA96MA054).
Retrieved from National Transportation Safety Board website:
file:///C:/Users/Renee/Downloads/J11142014120000.pdf
National Transportation Safety Board, (n.d.). Aviation query index. Retrieved from
http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/index.aspx
Prnewswire.com,. (2014). Alaska Air Group Reports Record Third Quarter 2014 Results.
Retrieved 4 October 2014, from http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/alaska-air-group-reports-record-third-quarter-2014-results366277626.html
Raghavan, S. (2012). Financial health and airlines safety. Review of Business Research,
12(5), 156(7)

30

Reason, J. (1997). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. (p. 61). Burlington,
VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.
Rose, N. (1989). Financial influences on airline safety. Transportation Safety in an Age
of Deregulation. Oxford University Press: New York.
RITA, BTS, Transtats. (n.d.). Retrieved October 14, 2014, from
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Oneway.asp?Field_Desc=Departures
Performed&Field_Type=Num&Sel_Cat=UNIQUE_CARRIER&Lookup_Table=
&Sel_Var=DEPARTURES_PERFORMED&Sel_Stat=Sum&Data_Type=CONT
&Percent_Flag=0&Display_Flag=0
Shiavo, M. (1997). Flying blind, flying safe. New York, New York: Avon Books.
Sinclair, R., Martin, J., & Sears, L. (2010). Labor unions and safety climate: Perceived
union safety values and retail employee safety outcomes. Accident Analysis and
Prevention, 42(2010), 1477-1487. Retrieved from www.elsevier.com/locate/aap
Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airline Operations, Worldwide operations 19592014. (2014, August 1). Retrieved October 30, 2014, from
http://www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf
Teamsters Airline Division. (n.d.). Retrieved July 14, 2014, from
http://teamsterair.org/about/who-we-represent
Thurber, M. (2013, September 1). New training rules to cost upcoming atps thousands of
dollars. Aviation International News, Retrieved from
http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/aviation-international-news/2013-0901/new-training-rule-cost-upcoming-atps-thousands-dollars

31

Transport workers union, local 556 history. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://twu556.org/about-us/local-556-history/
Wald, M. (2009, May 14). Pilots set up for fatigue, officials say. The New York Times.
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/14/nyregion/14pilot.html?_r=0
Wykoff, D., Kay, R., Kilmer, J., Nordengen, A. & Gauthier, M. (2008, October 9).
Fighting fatigue. Air Line Pilot, Retrieved September 20, 2013, from
http://www.alpa.org/portals/alpa/fatigue/MagazineInsert102008_FatigueGuide.pdf

32

